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I. Introduction
Individuals save for a variety of reasons. For some, savings is bequest motivated, be it altruistic or strategic in nature. For others, it may reflect the simple desire to accumulate wealth. Regardless of the motivation, wealthy savers may have preset preferences as to how to divide their accumulated wealth among the various donees and heirs at death. Estate and inheritance taxes, by altering relative prices, may alter the division of these bequests. Even in the case of accidental bequests, savers may not be too indifferent as to how their terminal wealth is ultimately divided between the government and potential heirs.
Because bequests to charitable organizations are deductible in computing the estate tax liability, estate taxation lowers the price of such transfers relative to those to children.
At the very same time, the estate tax lowers after-tax terminal wealth and the potential size of inheritances. These tendencies raise important policy considerations related to how changes in estate tax rates, including the elimination of the estate tax, may affect giving.
Indeed, charitable bequests and the potential effects of estate taxation continue to attract attention, and feature prominently in the debate on taxing inheritances in the United States.
With the wealthy leaving behind some $20 billion in charitable bequests annually, the implications of public policy for these sizeable transfers are worthy of study.
Much of the literature, reflecting the uniqueness of death, has relied on crosssectional data in exploring the sensitivity of bequests to the estate tax. Individuals are assumed to choose between bequests to charity and bequests to children (and other heirs) by implicitly setting the marginal rate of substitution between the two to equal the relative price of charitable bequests. The price of spousal bequests is ignored and the estate tax is assumed, implicitly or explicitly (Joulfaian, 2000a) , not to affect the choice between spousal and charitable bequests. 1 Many of the existing studies find large tax price elasticities suggesting that the deductibility is a significant stimulant to giving.
2 Many also find large wealth elasticities, which suggests that the estate tax, by lowering "bequeathable" or disposable wealth, has a dampening effect on giving. These estimates are not without their critics. Identifying the effects of progressive estate tax rates separately from wealth (Feenberg, 1987) , for instance, may represent a serious challenge in evaluating the effects of estate taxation especially as only cross sectional data are available, again reflecting the uniqueness of death (Poterba, 1998) . Joulfaian (2000a) employs variations in state tax rates to address this concern. Others, however, such as Barthold and Plotnick (1984) , the only study to date to have employed longitudinal micro data, and more recently Kopczuk and Slemrod (2003) and Bakija, Gale, and Slemrod (2003) , resort to pooling cross sectional or aggregated time series data over a long period where numerous changes in tax regimes have taken place.
Generally, it is difficult to draw inferences from the observed trend in aggregate bequests (Auten, Clotfelter, and Schmalbeck , 2000, percent. In contrast, Barthold and Plotnick (1984) , who employ pooled Connecticut probate records for the 1930s and 1940s, a period characterized by frequent changes in tax regimes, find taxes to have virtually no effect on giving. Large donors are likely to be very wealthy who may also face high tax rates by virtue of the progressive tax rate schedule. Thus it is difficult to disentangle the effects of wealth separately from those of high tax rates on giving. Resorting to pooled cross sectional or time series aggregate data is one way to address this identification problem as they exploit variations in statutory tax rates, changes that are independent of wealth variations. But this may also introduce a number of other biases, or at the very least exacerbate them. As Clotfelter (1985, pp. 240 ) points out, the price term is likely to be measured with error during periods of frequent changes in tax rates because it is not clear whether reported charitable bequests are influenced by current or past tax rates.
Furthermore, there is also the question of whether planned bequests reflect future taxes, as estate planning by its very nature is forward looking. Indeed, the swift adjustment in spousal bequests documented in Bernheim (1987) The paper is organized as follows. Section II explores issues related to modeling the effects of estate taxation on charitable bequests for married couples. Section III describes the data and presents some basic results, while section IV provides some econometric findings. Section V concludes.
II. Modeling Charitable Bequests
A married individual faces at least three options in disposing of terminal wealth accumulated over a lifetime. He may bequeath his wealth to his surviving spouse, transfer 5 In 1976, spousal bequests were deductible to the extent they did not exceed one half the estate. These bequests became fully deductible in 1982. As such, post 1982 data on widowed decedents grow less compatible over time depending on the size of spousal bequest and the remaining life expectancy of the surviving spouse (see Joulfaian, 1998, it to his children (and other relatives and friends), or donate it to charity. If the estate tax treats these transfers differentially, then this may influence the allocation of bequests amongst the survivors. As such, an individual's objective is then to determine how to allocate this terminal wealth among the three potential donees.
More formally, and in a very simple model, an individual's utility is determined by charitable bequests (C), bequests to heirs (B), and spousal bequests (S) at death in period 1, or:
The individual maximizes his utility subject to a budget constraint which requires that expenditures on charitable and non-charitable bequests not exceed the individual's terminal wealth W, or:
where P C denotes the tax price of charitable bequests, P S for spousal bequests, P B for bequests to children and others defined as P B =1/(1-T'). At a marginal tax rate T' of 0.55, it will cost the donor $2.22 for every $1 in bequests (B). In contrast, bequests to charity are exempt from taxation as they are deductible in computing the estate tax. Similarly, spousal bequests are fully deductible. Thus, P C = P S =1, or the more familiar 1-T' when stated relative to the price of bequests to heirs. Before 1982, however, spousal bequests were deductible only to the extent that they did not exceed 50 percent of the estate. Thus, the price of spousal bequests was one when these bequests were less than one half the gross estate (P S =1), and P S =1/(1-T') when they exceeded this threshold.
Solving for the first-order conditions, not surprisingly spousal bequests decline with its tax price, or:
This is consistent with the experience in the aftermath of the introduction of the unlimited marital deduction, i.e., T'=0, in 1982 (Bernheim, 1987) . Spousal bequests reported in 1982, when measured relative to the wealth of the estates, were 60 percent larger than the amount that is likely to have been reported under the law in effect in 1976 (Joulfaian, 2000b) .
The surviving spouse is also faced with a similar, albeit limited, set of choices at death in period 2. More specifically, her choice is how to allocate her own accumulated wealth (W S ) plus wealth inherited from her spouse (S) between bequests to her children (B) and charity (C). More specifically, she maximizes her utility:
subject to the budget constraint that her transfers do not exceed her terminal wealth W 2 :
6 I ignore discounting to simplify the exposition.
where her terminal wealth consists of her own accumulated wealth plus bequests from her ∂W 2 spouse, or W 2 = W S + S such that ∂P S < 0 from (3), for a given W S ; the terminal wealth of the spouse in period 2 is influenced by the tax regime in period 1. Equally important is the influence of spousal bequests on the observed tax price of giving to charity in period 2;
Solving for the first order conditions yields,
or, after some substitutions,
which suggests that charitable bequests by the surviving spouse in period 2 are influenced by the terminal wealth of the first to die, W 1 , and the price of spousal bequests P S in period 1. 7 In other words, we cannot ignore the effects of the tax regime in period 1 on giving and wealth in period 2 for widowed individuals.
III. Preliminary Look at Estate Tax Data
In moving away from the reliance on cross sectional estate tax data, the challenge in using longitudinal data is to control for the tax treatment of transfers to various donees as well as the frequently changing tax regimes. In particular, and as demonstrated above, the treatment of spousal transfers is the most problematic and commonly ignored in the literature. One approach to addressing this problem is to simply exclude married decedents. As eluded to earlier, however, this continues to overlook the influence of spousal bequests on the observed wealth of the surviving spouse (the second to die), which itself can be determined by past tax regimes. To motivate the analysis, I first restrict the sample to widowed and married decedents. Their pattern of charitable bequests over the two periods is summarized in Figure 1A -B. Figure 1A shows the probability of giving to rise with wealth. Similarly, Figure 1B shows the share of wealth transferred to also rise with wealth. But given the progressive tax rate schedules in Table 1 However, and as demonstrated in Figure 2 , much of the trend observed in Figure 1 is reversed when married decedents are excluded and the focus is restricted to widowed decedents. Indeed, in the case of the wealthiest of estates, those in excess of $20 million, the share of wealth transferred almost doubles. 12 Despite the tax rate reductions, the "generosity" of the very wealthy seems to have increased. 12 Note that this group accounts from one half the bequests reported in the sample, weighted or otherwise.
Controlling for spousal bequests and their ultimate disposition is rather a difficult task, particularly as it requires the tracking of married couples across time and tax regime.
As such, I focus only on widowed, never married singles, and divorced/separated decedents. The resulting sample consists of 14,051 estates, with about 55 percent representing decedents in 1976. Table 2 provides summary statistics for select variables, with all amounts stated in $1982. The mean charitable bequest CB is $287,300, with about one third giving to charity. Net of the tax savings from its deductibility, the mean after-tax bequest is $114,900, measured as CB-(T -T), where T is actual tax paid and T is the tax 0 0 liability computed by setting charitable bequests to zero; T=T(W-CB) and T 0 =T(W). These estates are large with mean wealth W of about $1.6 million, and standard error of $17 million. Net of taxes paid, as well as the tax savings from deducting charitable bequests, 0 i.e. W-T , disposable wealth is $886,500. This represents the maximum amount that can be transferred to the heirs. The average tax price P=(1-T') is 0.65. When evaluated using fully phased-in tax law, the after-tax wealth and charitable bequests, as well as the tax price, are higher.
Comparing those who give to those who don't give, and as illustrated in columns 2 and 3 of Table 2 , we find that the sample of donors are wealthier with mean wealth of $2.6 million compared to $1 million for non-donors. They are also older with mean age of 81 years compared to 76 years for non-donors, and more likely to have never married.
However, there seems to be very little difference in observed tax prices particularly when the fully phased-in tax law is used.
IV. Multivariate Analysis
I employ multivariate analysis to further gauge the effects of estate taxation, and control for the other determinants of charitable bequests. The latter include demographic variables such as age, gender, and marital status, as well as bequeathable or disposable wealth. Of particular interest is how these variables, the tax price and wealth in particular, influence the observed budget share (ω) allocated to charity. More specifically, I estimate the following equation for estate i in period t, where w is disposable wealth, W-T 0 , or the maximum amount that can be transferred to the heirs, and Z is a vector of demographic attributes, or:
Two measures of the budget share are considered. One measure defines the budget share as [CB-(T 0 -T)]/(W-T 0 ) consistent with Joulfaian (2000) . 13 Another is the linear variant CB(1-T')/(W-T 0 ) explored in Randolph (1995) . Under a proportional tax system, the two would be identical except when the entire estate is left to charity; T'=0 but T 0 -T>0. 14 Beginning with the latter, a critical variable in explaining charitable giving is the tax price. This price, however, is likely to be endogenous to the size of bequests, as they reduce the size of the taxable estate; T=T(W-CB). Consequently, the tax price is instrumented using the first dollar tax price on charity. This marginal tax rate is derived by setting charitable bequests to zero and assuming $1,000 in gifts for all estates. As with all previous longitudinal studies on charitable bequests, the tax price is measured using the tax
The numerator may be restated as ∑ CB j P j which reflects the convexity of the tax rate schedule and j=1 captures the various j kinks in the budget constraint. law in effect in the year of death even though changes in tax regimes are known in advance. This restriction is relaxed later on, where the future tax price is employed.
Reflecting the censored nature of the data, FIML Tobit is employed in estimating (8) with results reported in Table 3 . Beginning with demographic variables, the never married singles, as well as those divorced or separated bequeath more than their widowed counterparts. Gender seems to have some effect on giving, with male decedents leaving behind smaller bequests. Bequests rise with age, but at a declining rate. Those from the west or the south seem to be less generous.
Turning to the key variables of interest, and beginning with wealth, the estimated coefficient is 0.094 with a standard error of 0.009. In contrast, the coefficient on the tax price is negative with an estimated value of -0.124 and standard error of 0.057. Using these estimated parameters, the predicted change in bequests is approximated for each estate i in period t by first deriving the expected or fitted value for bequests from (8), or:
and comparing it to the value predicted after setting all the tax values to zero, i.e. T=T'=0, or:
where Φ=Φ(β'x/σ) and φ=φ(β'x/σ) are the distribution and density functions of the standard normal which vary with the tax regime embodied in the regressors x.
Other things equal, these estimates suggest that in the absence of the estate tax, charitable bequests would decline by 3 percent, from a predicted weighted mean bequest of $87,600 down to $84,300 (see bottom of Table 3 ). 15 At the same time, the probability Φ of making such bequests declines from a predicted 33 percent to 28 percent. Charitable bequests are predicted to decline by about 65 percent to $30,600 (sd=861,500) if only their deductibility were to be repealed. To gauge the sensitivity of the above estimates to this possibility, the parameters in column one of Table 3 are re-estimated using the fully phased-in law. In other words, the maximum tax rate in effect is now 50 percent, and not the 65 percent in effect in 1982.
Similarly, the size of the exempted estate is $600,000 instead of $225,000. The results are reported in column 2. Most of the coefficients estimated for the fully phased-in regime are somewhat different from those reported earlier. More specifically, the wealth coefficient is estimated with a value of 0.133 (se=0.007), significantly larger than the earlier estimate.
The tax price coefficient is now positive, with a value of 0.06 (se=0.03). Combined, the estimates point to a much higher wealth effect. Repealing the estate tax increases predicted bequests by about 62 percent, from a mean of $85,100 to $139,100, while repealing only the deductibility of charitable bequests would reduce it by a third down to $59,300 (sd=1,332,400).
For presentational purposes, wealth and price elasticity coefficients are calculated for each observation. The wealth elasticity is estimated as:
and price elasticity as:
Using the actual budget share for each observation, the overall charitable bequest weighted wealth elasticity is 1.16, with a price elasticity of -1.21. In contrast, the wealth and price elasticity coefficients become 1.2 and -0.9, respectively, when future law is considered. Now, had the budget share measure been defined as in Joulfaian (2000) , the estimated effects would have changed significantly. As shown in Table 4 , the wealth and price estimated coefficients are consistent with those reported earlier in Table 3 . In the absence of the estate tax, bequests decline by 13 percent, from a predicted weighted mean of $104,200 to $90,800. On the other hand, and using the future tax regime, the predicted bequests rise by three percent, from a mean of $105,300 to $108,500. The predicted or expected bequest for each observation is derived from:
and contrasted with that predicted in the absence of an estate tax, or:
The divergent, though qualitatively similar, results highlight the importance of the specification employed in gauging the effects of estate taxation. The predicted change in bequests in case of repeal of the estate tax ranges from -13 to +3 percent when the latter specification is employed as in Table 4 , compared to -3 to +62 percent in case of the earlier specification which employs a linear measure of the budget share. The specification in Table 4 , however, has a greater predictive power. It predicts an average bequest of $104,200 compared to $87,600 in the alternative specification; the actual is $124,000. In addition, it predicts a maximum bequest well over $1 billion, pretty close to the actual, compared to a maximum under $300 million using the specification in Table 3 .
The above estimated effects change considerably, but not qualitatively, when estates with wealth in excess of $20 million are excluded. 16 In case of estate tax repeal, and using the specification in Table 3 , bequests decline by 20 percent using the year of death law and increase by 18 percent using future law. In contrast, bequests increase by 13 and 15 percent, respectively, using the specification in Table 4 . The gap in the estimated effects highlights the importance of the presence of the wealthiest group, and points to the potential aggregation bias common to grouped and aggregated time series data.
It is interesting to note that there is little change in the qualitative results when the data is limited to the never-married singles. Using the specification in Table 3, charitable bequests by this group would decline by 12 percent if the estate tax were repealed.
However, they would increase by 18 percent using future law measure of the tax price.
16 This reduces the sample size to 14,010 observation with mean bequests of 65,900 and sd=399,600. The excluded observations number 41, with mean 54,046,100 and sd=215,371,400, and account for about half the bequests.
Using the specification in compared to the trend in 1976 when tax rates were higher. This trend suggests that estate taxation has little effect on bequests. Except for the stimulating effect of the deductibility of bequests, a similar conclusion is arrived at using multivariate analysis.
Notwithstanding the above findings, some may arrive at different conclusions using the very same estimated parameters. This paper assumes that estate tax repeal increases disposable wealth from W-T 0 to W. In contrast, McClelland (2004, p. 4) advocates that wealth should increase only by the tax liability below an estate's marginal tax rate. As an illustration, consider a taxable estate of $100 million which pays $55 million in estate taxes, facing a maximum tax rate of 55 percent under current (fully phased-in) law. Estate tax repeal in this paper is assumed to increase wealth by $55 million, from $45 to $100 million, which can be used to increase bequests to heirs as well gifts to charity. On the other hand, and using the assumptions in McClelland (2004) , wealth will increase by less than $2 million.
17 Note that no observation in 1976 reported wealth in excess of $20 million.
This paper also highlights the sensitivity of estimates to the expected tax regime in effect at death. The estimated effects of estate taxation vary considerably depending on whether behavior and estate planning reflect the current or expected tax regimes. If donors are assumed to respond to the tax regime in place at the date of death, then estate tax repeal would lead to a small reduction in bequests. On the other hand, if donors plan with the future tax regime in mind, then estate tax repeal may lead to a small increase in gifts.
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